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Judicial Rhetoric and the Rhetoric of Myth in "Till We Have Faces"

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**Judicial Rhetoric and the Rhetoric of Myth in *Till We Have Faces*:
Examining Reason and Imagination in Faith, Hidden Divinity
and the Nature of Love in C. S. Lewis's Retold Myth**

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Abstract

C.S. Lewis is unquestionably one of the more enduring influences in the 20th century, due in part to his personal popularity during his lifetime, as well as to his prolific and approachable oeuvre in wide-ranging genres such as apologetics, fiction, and public debate and address. Lewis has only become more popular since his death, with continued interest building after the more recent development of movie interpretations depicting both his fiction and life. C.S. Lewis's corpus is certainly vast, and even more has been written about C.S. Lewis and his writings since his death. Strong scholarship exists, particularly in the areas of literary criticism and theological analysis; however, significantly less work has been done examining the rhetorical aspects of Lewis's work. James Beitler, professor of English at Wheaton College, asserts, "However, in spite of widespread praise for Lewis's persuasiveness as well as his own interest in the topic, only a relatively small group of scholars have turned to rhetoric—the study and practice of the art of persuasion—to understand Lewis's corpus, and many who have done so have argued that we need more scholarship exploring how Lewis's writings work rhetorically" (353). This gap between literary and theological analysis and rhetorical analysis is significant considering Lewis's classical education and skillful use of the art of rhetoric. To begin to lessen this gap, in this paper, I will examine Lewis' use of the rhetoric of myth through his final novel, *Till We Have Faces*, by comparing how he presents Orual's judicial rhetoric with his own use of myth to persuade the reader of important truths about the roles reason and imagination play in spirituality, about identity, and about the

nature of love. This comparison will illuminate Lewis's beliefs on the limitations of direct persuasive rhetoric versus the natural working of the rhetoric of myth.

Dedication

To all my family who supports me in innumerable ways. I love you all so dearly and could not have completed this work without your love, encouragement, and support.

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Introduction

C.S. Lewis is unquestionably one of the more enduring influences of the 20th century, due in part to his personal popularity during his lifetime, as well as to his prolific and approachable oeuvre in wide-ranging genres such as apologetics, fiction, debate, and public address. Lewis has only become more popular since his death, with continued interest building after the more recent development of movie interpretations depicting both his fiction and life. C.S. Lewis's corpus is certainly vast, and even more has been written about C.S. Lewis and his writings since his death. Strong scholarship exists, particularly in the areas of literary criticism and theological analysis; however, significantly less work has been done examining the rhetorical aspects of Lewis's work. James Beitler, professor of English at Wheaton College, asserts, "in spite of widespread praise for Lewis's persuasiveness as well as his own interest in the topic, only a relatively small group of scholars have turned to rhetoric—the study and practice of the art of persuasion—to understand Lewis's corpus, and many who have done so have argued that we need more scholarship exploring how Lewis's writings work rhetorically" (353). This gap between literary and theological analysis and rhetorical analysis is significant considering Lewis's classical education and skillful use of the art of rhetoric. Lewis even identifies himself as a rhetor in a letter, saying, "Like all us Celts I am a born rhetorician" (Tandy, *Certitude* 27). Indeed, some scholars have examined Lewis's rhetoric. Notably, James Como's *Branches to Heaven* looks at Lewis's rhetoric and his views of the same art. In addition, James Beitler discusses Lewis's "rhetoric of goodwill" in his article, "An Advent Witness," while Dr. Gary Tandy examines Lewis's "rhetoric of certitude."

Considering Lewis's broad impact and publication record, scholarship is still lacking, and rhetorical analyses such as Como, Beitler, and Tandy's primarily explore Lewis's non-fiction prose. Even fewer scholars have examined his fictional works rhetorically. One exception is Craig Mattson's rhetorical examination of one of Lewis's most complex novels, *Till We Have Faces*. In his article "Never at Home in Glome: A Rhetorical Account of C.S. Lewis's Last Novel," Mattson focuses on the shift from visual/aural dualism to visual/aural integration, which is highlighted by the shift from agonistic to identificatory rhetoric. Mattson's fascinating comparison exemplifies the type of rhetorical scholarship needed for examining more of Lewis's fiction. In this paper, I will examine Lewis's rhetoric of myth, particularly juxtaposed with judicial rhetoric. The rhetoric of myth for this purpose is defined as the nature of myth to persuade of truth, producing spiritual transformation through the experience of recognition.

Both Alan Cluver, Professor of Speech and Rhetoric at Oklahoma University, and Warren Rochelle, Professor of English at the University of Mary Washington, use the term "rhetoric of myth." Cluver uses the term for examining Chinese government ideology and Rochelle to analyze modern author Ursula K. Le Guin. My use of the term in this paper is more similar than not to how Rochelle uses the term in his book, analyzing the fiction of Le Guin. Rochelle describes Le Guin's rhetoric of myth as one that takes the reader through story and myth to find a way of connecting humanity in love and "argues for multiple ways of knowing, of discovering the truth—and that, indeed, truth is possible. . . . Le Guin's rhetoric is an argument for being fully human: Apollonian and Dionysian, rational and irrational, body and soul, heart and mind. And to be fully

human is to use language as story to make meaning” (Rochelle 173). This last aspect, discovering truth to become fully human, is a key component to the “rhetoric of myth.” In this paper, I will examine Lewis’ use of the rhetoric of myth through his final novel, *Till We Have Faces*, by comparing how he presents Orual’s judicial rhetoric with his own use of myth to persuade the reader of important truths about the roles reason and imagination play in spirituality, about identity, and about the nature of love. This comparison will illuminate Lewis’ beliefs on the limitations of direct, persuasive rhetoric versus the superior, natural working of the rhetoric of myth.

Toward this goal, I will first address narrative as rhetoric, examining how stories persuade. My next section will begin the analysis of these two types of rhetoric, beginning with how Lewis uses Orual’s judicial rhetoric to retell the Cupid and Psyche myth. In an interesting turn, Orual fails in her original aim of being vindicated for being treated so unjustly by the gods—her purpose for using this classic form of rhetoric. However, Lewis may be providing a bit of commentary on the nature of this formal style of rhetoric in addition to his other goals. Orual fails in her aim, but far more importantly, her exercise of judicial rhetoric still brings her to the realization of truth. Lewis uses this classic style of rhetoric embedded in a rhetoric of myth. The following section looks deeper into Lewis’ view of myth particularly and how myth utilizes symbolism to embody truth. With this foundation, the last section explores how Lewis uses this rhetoric of myth in *Till We Have Faces* to persuade the reader about the realities of the material and spiritual world. Through this novel, Lewis acknowledges that judicial rhetoric has a proper place, particularly in matters of the material world, but the rhetoric of myth is superior for persuading the reader about the wisdom and truths of the spiritual world.

Chapter I.


Rhetoric of Narrative

While Lewis was primarily concerned with myth as a subcategory of narrative, the broader rhetorical nature of narrative must be examined first. Classicists tend to employ a narrow definition of rhetoric, focusing on oral persuasion, but more recently, many scholars have expanded the idea of rhetoric to include narrative. Unlike the modern political use of the term, Aristotle's perspective of rhetoric is concerned with discovering truth. He declares, "Persuasion is produced by the speech itself, when we establish the true or apparently true from the means of persuasion applicable to each individual subject" (Aristotle 1.2.6). Scholars with this Aristotelian view tend to hold to a narrower definition, excluding fiction from their definition of rhetoric. While direct, formal oratory is the type of rhetoric most often referenced by classicists, even Aristotle in *Poetics* mentions there is a sense in which both oratory and drama are rhetorical (Kirby 1). Having received a thoroughly classical education and being a prolific reader, Lewis was very familiar with the ancients and their varied definitions and descriptions of rhetoric. Addressing their views of literature and persuasion, Lewis declares that the "older poetry

was written by people who knew no distinction between poetry and rhetoric and that they praised 'beauties' at best opaque to us" (Como 145).

Lewis notes here that the ancients include creative works in rhetoric, presenting a broader view of persuasion than many classicists seem to hold. In

agreement with Aristotle and Lewis, this paper will argue that narrative is rhetorical.



However, this is distinct from Lewis's idea discussed later, the rhetoric of myth. Myth may be any particular story, based on how the reader relates to the narrative, however one key is that the myth (like formal oratory) is persuasive and changes the reader with lasting results.

So, how does narrative convince? How does a story appeal differently to the audience than an apologetic work or law book? John Rodden asserts that these are important questions to ask because we live our lives as a story—or narrative—which “is a central part of our self-talk and of the conversations about us” (148). This human activity, viewing one's life as a story, is described by Tolkien as well in his novel, *The Two Towers*. The loyal hobbit Sam Gamgee talks about the different kinds of stories of adventurers who have gone before and wonders aloud to Frodo what kind of story they might have fallen into. He thinks about his predecessors through retold stories and imagines himself and Frodo in a story that may be retold one day as well. According to writer and professor of humanities Anthony Esolen, “it is perfectly natural in man to do this” (124). For a child, a walk to the park becomes a quest to avoid the dangers of the swallowing pit of the mud puddle and to conquer the dangers of brigands in order to arrive safely at the kingdom of the park's playground. However, viewing one's life as a story is not reserved for children only. Adults also tell the story of their lives, when desiring to connect more deeply and come to know one another better. They share their lives through their true stories—where they have been and what they have done—indicating what they value and believe. Because we view life this way, Rodden further insists that in examining the nature of narrative, we must move beyond asking the *what* of narrative and begin asking questions about the *how*. Shifting from *what* to *how* moves the questions

from the grammar and dialectic of narrative to the rhetoric (Rodden 149). This rhetoric of narrative is concerned with how we view and live our lives. This rhetoric is part of what makes us human and allows us to connect and communicate with one another.

In addition to narrative being the form in which we view our own lives, narrative develops culture, providing a sense of home and belonging. Every society and civilization has a way of passing stories, knowledge, and accumulated wisdom from one generation to the next. Eminent theologian and author Stratford Caldecott reminds his audience that these stories are part of the “collective memory of the society to which we belong [that] has the name ‘tradition.’ We cannot truly be ‘at home’ without one” (*Word* 43). Stories provide an identity, a community for belonging. Stories build culture by inculcating the values important for that family or social group, passing wisdom from generation to generation. This culture-building depends on being able to pass stories on to others because these stories are “vehicles of meaning” (52). Since stories reflect our lives and “become part of our cultural fabric and social mythology,” we must recognize that they do more than simply entertain (Rodden 149). This rhetoric of narrative is concerned with how we view and live our lives. This rhetoric is part of what makes us human and allows us to connect and communicate with one another.

While stories are both the framework for life and vehicles for meaning and enculturation, perhaps another reason stories are powerful is their connection to beauty, a transcendental property of being.¹ Stories instruct and persuade in a way that is not only good or true but also (and perhaps more important in this case) in a way that is beautiful. Much of modern culture misunderstands the concept of beauty as a transcendental (or a

¹ Medieval scholars recognized the transcendental properties of being as truth, beauty, and goodness. These transcendentals are the innate qualities or traits that exist in all things.

property of being). Professor of philosophy, Elizabeth Kovacs, explains that the idea of beauty goes far beyond what we can see in an object, but is a principle of form, “originating from God’s divine intelligence, and allowing a thing to exist as beautiful with or without being observed. Whether this beauty is presented as striking, visually appealing, geometrically perfect, or in something working out just so, it stems from the pure goodness and beauty of God and his intelligence in his created forms” (96). Beauty is an objective reality based in the character of God.

While many people have a solid basis for understanding truth and goodness, they think of beauty as personal and subjective rather than transcendental. This modern perception of beauty indicates the prevailing philosophies that separate the empirical from the artistic and spiritual. Describing this fracture, Caldecott proposes that the loss of beauty is key to the loss of unity between the arts and the sciences. This loss of unity occurred precisely because beauty is one of the transcendental properties of being, which means properties that are found in absolutely everything that exists (*Truth’s Sake* 31). Fracturing beauty from the other transcendentals is devastating because “beauty is the radiance of the true and good, and it is what attracts us to both” (31). The beauty of narrative not only highlights what is good and true but also renders it appealing to the reader and draws the reader further up and further in. The beauty of the narrative persuades.

However, simply seeing the true and good as beautiful is not enough. True virtue is not limited to knowledge but produces desire and action. Perhaps surprisingly, imagination is key in helping each human not only see the truth but also desire what one ought to do, providing the judgment to choose the good of a higher purpose. Following in

the footsteps of Edmund Burke, Russell Kirk, a political theorist, historian, and literary critic, often asserted the importance of the moral imagination. Russell Kirk sees beauty as the link between the imagination and desiring what is good, asserting, “A truly beautiful piece of fine art causes that judgment to desire that which human beings ought to desire” (Zimmerer 96). Human beings are naturally drawn to the beautiful. However, beauty is not something simply to observe. Beauty is not simply to entertain, to please the eye, or to give a sense of symmetry; beauty works upon the *ethos* of a person to influence and convince. Endless injunctions and lists of what must or must not be done are not typically an effective way to communicate morality or virtue, but effectiveness is found “through the imagination—through stories, drama, and living examples of engaging the will and emotions, inspiring us to be better people” (Caldecott, *Word* 31). Humans are multifaceted, having will, reason, and imagination. Rational instruction or appeal addresses the logic of discursive intellect; however, beauty resonates with imagination. The moral imagination is nurtured and developed through the beautiful, as well as the true and good.

The theologian, professor, and author Vigen Guroian, in his book *Tending the Heart of Virtue*, also emphasizes the importance of story, especially fairy tales, for developing the moral imagination. Stories allow children, as well as adults, to wrestle with truth and morality. Guroian explains that “narrative supplies the imagination with important symbolic information about the shape of our world and appropriate responses to its inhabitants” (14). Stories are not a time-filler, a simple reading comprehension exercise, or even only for enjoyment, but are a crucial component of development for a human being. Symbols and images from narrative are necessary for the imagination to

make sense of the world. Even in formal education, the imagination is important for pondering truth and virtue; for practicing wonder. Stories forge the metaphors through the lives of heroes that give children the vision to make moral judgments (Guroian 24). In “Beauty, Order, and the Moral Imagination,” Dr. Jared Zimmerer, professor at Benedictine College, discusses the moral imagination, declaring “in certain ways, the great novel and the great poem can teach more of norms than can philosophy or theology” (Zimmerer 92). Why is this true? Why are stories more effective? Caldecott avers that “a morality, an *ethos*, must be embodied; it must be lived by a human being before it can be communicated” (Caldecott, *Word* 87). This embodiment constitutes the true purpose and goal of rhetoric of narrative as well.

The heart of rhetoric (the narrative and all other types) is not simply ancient techniques to impress and influence one’s listeners. Unlike many modern uses, the core of rhetoric is not bending someone’s will to another’s or manipulating the listener’s emotions. True rhetoric is “rather a way of liberating the freedom of others by showing them the truth in a form they can understand” (Caldecott, *Word* 92). The aesthetics of poetry and art awaken the moral imagination, and the imagination is crucial for the proper ordering of the soul.

James Phelan, literary scholar and English professor, agrees about the persuasive nature of story, or what he calls the rhetorical poetics of narrative. First, in defining narrative, he indicates that “narrative is ultimately not a structure, but an action” (Phelan 2). He takes time to emphasize that the teller has a purpose for sharing his or her story with an audience. The storyteller has a goal. In relation to this idea, his second point states that “the presence and the activity of the somebody else in the narrative action is

integral to its shape” (Phelan 2). He is referring here, particularly to the way that the responses of the audience influence how the story is shaped. The audience response is an important aspect in the rhetoric of the narrative—or stated more directly, the story is meant to evoke a response. This is how narrative can work on the *ethos* of a person.

A notable example of the rhetorical nature of narrative is the story the prophet Nathan tells King David in the Bible in 2 Samuel 12. This passage describes King David’s passion for Bathsheba, the wife of Uriah the Hittite, his sin in taking her, and the resulting pregnancy from his actions. David then contrives to cause the death of his warrior Uriah, striving to cover up his sin. God sends the prophet Nathan to confront King David. The story of Esther, also in the Old Testament, illuminates the risk Nathan was incurring by making an unsolicited visit to the king—especially when bringing a difficult message. Esther 5:2 describes how Esther dressed in her royal robes and waited for the king to show his favor by extending the royal scepter. Without this kingly acknowledgment, she would lose her life. While Nathan had standing and a measure of safety as God’s prophet, he also risked his life by appearing before the king with a reproach. When the prophet Nathan confronts David about his actions, he chooses the rhetorical strategy of a third-person narrative. He tells the story of a rich man with many flocks and herds and his poor neighbor—the poor man with little but a precious ewe lamb. A lamb who grew up with his children, lays in his arms, and drinks from his cup. The rich man steals the beloved lamb from the poor man, kills it, and prepares it as a meal for a visiting traveler. This story raises David’s indignation and sense of justice. He angrily declares, “As the LORD lives, the man who has done this deserves to die, and he shall restore the lamb fourfold, because he did this thing, and because he had no pity”

(*English Standard Version*, 2 Samuel 2:5–6). Nathan then cuts deep, declaring, “You are the man!” (2 Samuel 2:7). He lays out God’s charge before the king, and David responds contritely, “I have sinned against the LORD” (2 Samuel 2:13). When Nathan was sent to fulfill a potentially life-threatening task of confronting the king about his behavior, he needed to choose his approach to the king carefully. He needed to act rhetorically.

Narrative is both a framework for how people view their lives and a vehicle to convey meaning. Perhaps narrative is effective because of its connection to the transcendental property of being, beauty, and because narrative reveals the heart of being persuasive. Particularly, when a narrative functions as a myth (addressed in more depth in the next chapter), the story works rhetorically on the person to persuade about truth, particularly spiritual truth. In this way, narrative engages the imagination and impacts *ethos*, evoking an action or a response.

Chapter II.

Two Types of Rhetoric in *Till We Have Faces*

Orual's Judicial Rhetoric

Lewis's last novel displays two types of rhetoric through which he communicates truths about how reason relates to imagination, about identity, and about love. In his retelling of the ancient myth of Cupid and Psyche, Lewis employs the first-person point of view from the perspective of the older sister of Psyche, whom Lewis names Orual. The form her narrative embodies is judicial rhetoric, in which she lays out her case to be judged. The gods have hated Orual. Lewis provides commentary on her judicial rhetoric by using the rhetoric of myth to illustrate how Orual's rhetoric fails in her aim but still leads her ultimately to the truth.

Orual, Queen of Glome, proclaims at the beginning of the novel that she will write "what no one who has happiness would dare to write. I will accuse the gods, especially the god who lives on the Grey Mountain. That is, I will tell all he has done to me from the very beginning, as if I were making my complaint of him before a judge. But there is no judge between gods and men, and the god of the mountain will not answer me" (*Faces* 3). Near the end of her life, Orual presents her story in the form of a judicial address, calling into question the actions of the gods. While she does not imagine a judge answering her, she hopes instead that perhaps someday someone who is wise "will know whether my complaint is right or whether the god could have defended himself if he had made an answer" (3).

A clear comparison of these two rhetorical types requires definition, beginning with judicial rhetoric. In *On Rhetoric*, Aristotle describes three types of formal rhetoric², of which the judicial branch he calls forensic rhetoric. He declares that “the forensic kind is either accusatory or defensive; for litigants must necessarily either accuse or defend” (1.3.3). Orual’s story clearly fits this definition. She desires a judge between the gods and men since she accuses the gods of treating her unjustly. Aristotle also addresses the special time and end for each branch of rhetoric. The time frame that the judicial address is most concerned with is the past, and “the end of the forensic speaker is the just or the unjust” (1.3.5). Corbett and Connors, in *Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student*, elucidate that the judicial branch of rhetoric, “the oratory of the courtroom,” was the type most often described and explained in the classical rhetorics. Discussing litigation’s commonness, they assert that most often, the ordinary free citizen, usually the male head of the household, would go to court as much as six or more times in his lifetime. In addition, the average citizen would typically present his own case to the judge and jury without professional representation. Usually, a citizen “did not possess the comprehensive knowledge of the law and its technicalities that the professional lawyer did, but it was greatly to his advantage to have a general knowledge of the strategies of defense and prosecution. As a result, the schools of rhetoric did a flourishing business in training the layperson to defend himself in court or to prosecute an offending neighbor” (Corbett and Connors 124). Judicial rhetoric was the most common form practiced in ancient times and therefore the type about which the most was written.

² The three branches of formal rhetoric that Aristotle named are deliberative, forensic, and epideictic. Deliberative rhetoric seeks to persuade an audience to take an action (or not take an action). Forensic rhetoric considers the justice or injustice of past action. Epideictic rhetoric praises or blames something or someone.

In addition to Aristotle, Cicero also addresses several branches of rhetoric. For a judicial argument, Cicero suggests gathering all the actions attributed to a person into one palace to determine if there is any inconsistency in the character of the person (Cicero 15). (This test yields interesting results when applied to the character of Queen Orual in *Till We Have Faces*.) Cicero also famously describes the six parts of classical oration, which includes judicial rhetoric. The *exordium* is the introduction in which the audience is prepared for the subject, and the *ethos* of the writer is established. Cicero describes *narratio* as “an explanation of acts that have been done, or of acts as if they have been done,” which gives any necessary background and states the issue at hand (1.19). In the *partitio*, the division occurs between which facts are agreed upon and which facts are debated. The *confirmatio* is the main body of the argument, containing the proofs, and following after is the *reprehensio*, containing the refutation of opposing views. These first five parts are comprised primarily of appeal to *logos*. Finally, the *peroration* is the conclusion, which Cicero describes as a bringing together of the various pieces and parts, helping the hearers recollect the points made. This final portion employs the emotional appeal of *pathos*. Professor and scholar William Brant notes that “the *exordium*, *confirmatio*, and *peroration* are the three essential parts of the discourse, the other parts being used optionally depending on the particular speaker, subject, and audience” (Tandy, *Rhetoric of Certitude* 66). I posit that an examination of Orual’s argument reveals it contains five of the six parts described by Cicero, including the three parts Brant deems essential.

The first paragraph of the novel provides the *exordium* of Orual’s oration, her *ethos*. She is old. She has no husband or children. Her body is frail. The succession to the

throne of Glome is secured. For these reasons, she is unafraid to proclaim her *narratio*, an accusative explanation of what the gods have done to her. The gods have been cruel to her and have caused her to have an unhappy life. Especially at fault is the god who lives on the Grey Mountain. He is the cause of all her sorrows, especially the loss of her beloved Psyche. This accusation poses a few problems for Orual, however—particularly because she does not expect to hear from these hidden deities. They do not deign to answer her. So, she writes, perhaps some traveler will hear her tale and act as judge of whether she has indeed been hated and mistreated by the gods (*Faces* 3). This statement identifies the *divisio*. The facts of her life have indeed happened. Everyone will agree on this, but have the gods treated her unjustly? This is the main dividing point Orual is arguing.

The third paragraph begins Orual's *confirmatio*, in which she narrates the events of her life, comprising the bulk of the novel. She begins her list of hardships early in her life with the death of her mother. A custom of this pagan society is to shave the heads of the mourners. This scene is the first hint of another difficulty in Orual's life. She is ugly. The slave women stand around bemoaning the loss of her younger sister Redival's curly, golden locks, but not a word is spoken when Orual's head is shorn (5). Orual's relations with the Fox, a Greek philosopher slave who tutors Orual and her sister and cares about them, provides one of the few pleasant and happy places in her life. The explanations Orual gives to help the Fox understand her culture and the instruction the Fox delivers to the girls in stoic philosophy help set the scene for the modern-day reader. Glomish culture is pagan and ritualistic. This portion of the *confirmatio* also gives further necessary background for the reader, including this culture's treatment of slaves, belief in

the gods, participation in bloody sacrifices, and their pagan superstitions about childbirth and other natural events.

Continuing the *confirmatio* of Orual's argument and supporting her claim of being ugly are the comments made by her father, the king, in preparation for his second marriage. The Fox asks if the girls should be veiled or unveiled when they are commanded to sing a Greek hymn for the king's wedding. The laughter at her father's reply cuts Orual deeply: "'Need you ask?' says the king with one of his great laughs, jerking his thumb in my direction. 'Do you think I want my queen frightened out of her senses? Veils of course. And good thick ones too.'" (*Faces* 11). A short while later, the king, while angry (not an uncommon occurrence), called his daughter "curd face" (18). Her ugliness ostracizes the princess in many ways, and at one point in her adult life, she decides she will always wear a veil to cover her face completely. The events that led to that decision are significant, and her reasons for wearing the veil shifted over time, but the initial reason was the sense of her visage.

While she suffered from various negative reactions to her appearance her whole life and from physical and verbal abuse from her father, as well as experiencing loneliness and loss of family, her greatest sorrow in life is the loss of her relationship with her half-sister. After the death of her stepmother (a girl only slightly older than Orual at the time), Orual becomes the mother figure for her baby half-sister named Istra, which in Greek is Psyche. After spending the day in anguish under her father's threat of sending her beloved tutor, the Fox, to the mines, and then upon seeing Psyche for the first time, Orual declares, "And so, in one hour, I passed out of the worst anguish I had yet suffering into the beginning of all my joys" (20). From the beginning, even as a tiny

baby, Psyche radiates beauty and is often compared to a goddess. Looking upon her, “you would have thought she made bright all the corner of the room in which she lay” (20). She was always laughing, and was “‘according to nature’; what every woman, or even every thing out to have been and meant to be.... She made beauty all round her” (22). When she was a little older, a plague strikes Glome. Psyche works tirelessly, bringing food and caring for the sick. Over time, she was purported to be a goddess and to be able to heal with her touch. However, just as many of the people of Glome believed she could heal, as those that believed she could not. This divisive opinion eventually became a source of sorrow.

In spite of the loss of her mother, her physical appearance, and the poor relationship with her father, the most devastating blow the gods dealt Orual was the loss of her relationship with Psyche. Professor of English Dale Sullivan summarizes Orual’s relationship with Psyche and subsequent loss in this way, “Orual had taken on the role of mother to Psyche, had poured her life into Psyche, but had lost Psyche to the gods when the Priest of Ungit had declared that the God of the Grey Mountain, sometimes referred to as the Shadowbrute, required Psyche as a sacrifice” (*Faces* 42). When plague and pestilence strike Glome repeatedly, the superstitious precedent demands a sacrifice to appease the gods. The priest casts lots to determine the sacrifice, which falls on Princess Istra (Psyche). While some subjects of Glome believe Psyche heals with her touch, others insist her touch spreads the plague and brings death. When the lot falls on the youngest princess, she is destined to become the sacrificial lamb to satiate the anger of the gods. Pleasing the gods was the only way to end the devastating destruction.

This loss of her beloved sister is the main grievance Orual has against the gods. They took Psyche from her. The young princess had come to love Psyche like a mother, gently caring for her and offering “her protection, unselfishly defending her when their father agrees to expose Psyche on the mountain for ‘the Shadow-Brute’ to wed or to devour, the outcome at that point not clear to anyone. Orual is beaten by her father for this defense of her sister” (Enright 99). Evidencing her deep love, she had taken on a motherly role in caring for her half-sister; however, over time, Orual’s love became manipulative and jealous. Later, she discovers that when Psyche was given as a sacrifice to the gods, Psyche did not die but became the bride of the god of the Grey Mountain. Orual nearly cannot bear this turn of events—she wants to remain in this quasi-mother/daughter state forever. She tries to bring Psyche home, but Psyche professes happiness in her relationship with the god of the Grey Mountain. This new relationship is unthinkable to Orual, and her love morphs into jealousy, but “unlike the simple jealousy of the two sisters in the original myth, Orual's jealousy is far more complex; she wishes to be the one to reveal the truth to her sister, having a kind of ownership over her” (Enright 108). Later in her life, Orual acknowledges this corruption of love asserting, “we want to be our own. I was my own and Psyche was mine and no one else had any right to her” (*Faces* 291–292).

Orual goes through a series of disturbing manipulations and succeeds in forcing a wedge between Psyche and her husband god. This wedge, however, does not bring the sisters back together as she desired, but instead Psyche instead is banished to wander the earth suffering for her action, done out of love for her sister. This consequence, though, means Orual loses Psyche, too. This loss is the crux of her argument that the gods are

unjust and cruel to her. In discussing the loss of Psyche with the Fox, her advisor declares that to love and to lose what we love, are equally things appointed by to our nature (86). Orual's response, though, is reminiscent of her father, "At this the King scratched his head and looked very blank. 'That's just like the gods,' he muttered. 'Drive you to do a thing and then punish you for doing it. The comfort is I've no wife or son, Fox'" (58). The lynchpin of Orual's *confirmatio* is her devastating loss of Psyche at the hands of the god of the Grey Mountain.

The final required part of the judicial form is the *peroratio*. In this conclusion, Orual's perspective shifts. As she concludes her accusations, the old queen relates an encounter with a priest on her travels. She inquires about a veiled statue, and as he begins to tell the tale of this queen/goddess, Orual realizes that he is essentially telling the story of her and Psyche's lives. The legend is too close to their own story to be a coincidence, but he has some details drastically wrong—details that particularly cast the queen in a negative light. This encounter drives Orual to write her story in her mind as it actually happened. Toward the end of her life, Orual begins to realize her own manipulation and dark jealousy of Psyche and her own role in the loss of her relationship with her sister. In addition, she sees how her actions toward her full sister, Redival, have pushed her away, causing trouble for many people.

Interestingly, Orual's judicial address did not succeed—at least not in the manner typically expected. Orual declares from the beginning that she did not expect an answer from the gods; however, she did hope that she would be justified in her accusation against the gods. She desired that other objective parties would agree that the gods, especially the god of the Grey Mountain, hated her and had made her life miserable. In this respect, she

failed in her goal. However, perhaps more importantly, this exercise in rhetoric brings her to a realization of what is actually true. Eventually, she recognizes her jealousy and manipulation, which are the true causes of the loss her relationship with her sister. She finally quits blaming anyone and everyone else for her greatest sorrows, and realizes her own part in her circumstances. Orual's use of judicial rhetoric did not accomplish her intended goal, but through the exercise (as well as through receiving information and visions), she is brought to truth, which is the true goal of rhetoric. Lewis uses this exercise as a counterpoint in his rhetoric of myth. Tandy notes that Lewis shows an ambivalence toward rhetoric. At least, his views on rhetoric seem to shift in his writing throughout his life. While Lewis seems to denigrate the formal oratory type of rhetoric in certain writings, a close reading of all his work reveals he is concerned when rhetoric is misused to manipulate and control. Performed rightly and in the right circumstances, judicial rhetoric is good and beneficial. Later in his life, though, Lewis clearly preferred the rhetorical use of numinous narrative over the direct use of oratory or apologetics to communicate the most important truths about life and reality. Through Orual's story, Lewis indicates the limited efficacy of judicial rhetoric, at least in part because of its emphasis on the rational, not imaginative, or other human aspects. Conversely, Lewis highlights the preeminence of the rhetoric of myth to communicate truths that cannot be expressed better in other forms.

Lewis' Rhetoric of Myth

First, to understand how Lewis uses the rhetoric of myth in *Till We Have Faces*, a general understanding of his idea of myth is necessary. Lewis notes that a myth is a particular kind of story of value with the following six characteristics: 1) is extra-literary,

2) feels inevitable, meaning that it can be experienced over and over with the same enjoyment, 3) keeps sympathy for the characters at a minimum, without projecting ourselves on them, and therefore emphasizes a universal humanness, 4) is “fantastic,” that is “deals with impossibles and preternaturals,” 5) is grave, whether sad or joyful, and 6) is inspiring and numinous (that is, with a spiritual or divine quality) (*Experiment* 43–44). He further declares that he is not concerned so much with how myths arise as “the effects of myths as they act upon the conscious imagination of minds” (45). In Lewis’ view, the effect a myth has on a person is far more important than its composition. Since this definition focuses mostly on the myth’s impact, Lewis readily indicates that what may be a myth to one person may be simply a story to another. The reader who has experienced a myth does not use the myth simply in a literary way but will be impressed and affected by it throughout the rest of his life. The myth changes his perception of reality and gives meaning to his life—meaning that results in action. Lewis’s third, fifth, and sixth mythic characteristics (universal humanness, serious, and numinous) are particularly important for this transformational effect.

This perspective, however, was not the way Lewis viewed myth early in his life. The one-time hardened atheist argued long with his fellow don and friend Tolkien that myths were “lies” even if beautiful and “breathed through silver” (Jacobs 143). He could not believe in the truth of a myth. By definition, in his mind, a myth could not actually happen. Tolkien shifted Lewis’ thinking on the idea of myth when he touched on a point important to Lewis in own his lifelong search for a nearly indescribable, transportive experience to which he gave the shorthand term, joy. Tolkien asked his friend to ponder “why we dream and wish at all” rather than focusing on what joy was or how to get it

(Jacobs 145). He was pointing to the reality that myths and dreams communicate truths that cannot be realized in any other way.

A key turning point for Lewis was a late-night conversation with his friends, Tolkien and Dyson. He came to realize that “the story of Christ is simply a true myth: a myth working on us in the same way as the others, but with tremendous difference that it really happened” (Jacobs 149). Two disparate ideas finally “came together for Lewis—the historical reality of the life of Jesus Christ and its identification as the one True Myth” (Enright 95). This realization changed Lewis but also provided him with a new understanding of what a myth was and how it works on a person. His own regeneration initiated his transformed definition that “myths provide not just the intellectual understanding of truth, but a powerful imaginative experience of it” (Schakel, “Till We Have Faces” 288). Lewis’ fictional works provide a multitude of examples of the high importance he ascribed to spiritual conversion and, in conjunction that the imaginative experience of truth is transformational. Rebecca Hans, a literary scholar who focuses on the interactions of story and the individual religious experience, declares, “The narrative itself emphasizes the transformative nature of conversion not through apologetic argument, but through story, particularly the retelling of myths” (40). Lewis’ rhetoric of myth works through the imagination to allow a person to experience realities in a way that brings new realizations. Rather than being confronted with a logical argument, which needs to be analyzed for validity, understanding emerges from the experience. To effect change within a person, the belief must move from existence only in the intellectual realm to existence in the experiential realm. Belief must be lived out.

Perhaps a clue to better understand Lewis' view of myth as distinct from story can be found in his distinction between contemplation and enjoyment. According to Schakel, Lewis learned this distinction from the philosopher Samuel Alexander ("Till We Have Faces" 288). Simply, contemplation is to examine something from the outside, while enjoyment is to experience something from the inside. Lewis gives a few examples of this idea in his essay, "Meditation in a Toolshed." While standing in a dark toolshed on a bright day, a beam of light shined through a crack at the top of the door. Lewis describes the floating particles he sees in the beam of light while everything else in the shed remains in pitch darkness. He could see the beam of light but nothing else. Then he shifted so that the beam of light fell on his eyes. He writes, "Instantly the whole previous picture vanished. I saw no toolshed, and (above all) no beam. Instead I saw framed in the irregular cranny at the top of the door, green leaves moving on the branches of a tree outside and beyond that, 90 odd million miles away, the sun. Looking along the beam, and looking at the beam are very different experiences" ("Toolshed" 212). Looking along the beam allows a clear vision of everything else, while looking at the beam only allows a perspective of the beam.

Lewis gives another example in this essay of a young man meeting a girl and chatting with her so that she is soon worth more than anyone else in the world. The scientist might classify him as being "in love," but all the young man knows is that his whole world has changed and will never be the same. His experience of change (from the inside) through meeting a girl is very different from the analysis of his condition from the outside.

These examples illustrate the way “myths enable readers to enjoy (experience directly) things of permanent value that they otherwise can only contemplate (examine from the outside)” (Schakel, “Till We Have Faces ” 288). Lewis highlights the importance of experiencing an idea through narrative rather than simply analyzing an idea in a story. In his essay, “On Three Ways of Writing for Children,” Lewis puts aside the questions “What do modern children like?” and “What do modern children need?” for “What moral do I need?” This last question is better since Lewis declares that “what does not concern us deeply, will not deeply interest our readers” (62). In the end though, he believes even this better question should be left aside. Rather than focusing on these questions, Lewis instructs that instead, the author should “let the pictures tell you their own moral. For the moral inherent in them will rise from whatever spiritual roots you have succeeding in striking during the whole course of your life” (“Writing for Children” 63). Lewis believed in the power of experiencing the truth through enjoyment and imagination to affect change in his readers. Analysis ends up looking at the beam too much, focusing on the rational, and does not allow the reader to see the whole rest of the world through the beam, engaging the imagination.

Lewis’s view of the superiority of myth can be seen in his perspective on how a person interacts with literature. Rebecca Hans, summarizing Lewis’ essay “Experiment in Criticism,” observes, “While ‘receiving’ requires an exertion of the imagination and the senses, ‘using’ is a demand that the work assists in our own desires and pursuits” (19). He saw “using” as manipulative and putting too much of oneself as the reader into the story. He believed a far superior way is to receive the story and allow it to work upon the

reader. In a letter to Father Peter Milward, Lewis explains this hierarchy further, also bringing in allegory:

‘[A] good myth (i.e., a story out of which ever varying meanings will grow for different readers and in different ages) is a higher thing than allegory (into which a meaning has been put). Into an allegory a man can put only what he knows: in a myth he puts what he does not yet know and c[ould] not come to know in any other way.’ In other words, allegory requires the making of connections, and the making of connections requires some sort of recognition of the two items to be connected. It is dependent on the reader’s own knowledge, whereas myth, or any other such imaginative story can extend beyond personal experience to grow and transform the reader. (Hans 20)

Myth is superior to allegory because it transports and does not require something from the reader he may not have. Myth transforms when allegory cannot. That myth is extra-literary and not dependent on a form (Lewis’ first mythic characteristic) is important to this point. For Lewis, myth is important for communicating reality through the medium of narrative because it allows the reader to experience truth and see the rest of life in light of that truth. In contrast to myth, Orual narrates the story of her life but as a mechanism to justify her anger and resentment. Orual relies on logical argument to influence a judge to agree that she has been treated. This argument, while potentially persuasive, has limits in its efficacy for transformation. In this case, she not only fails to convince anyone that the gods treat her poorly, but in the end, she is the one who is persuaded to a different viewpoint. She realizes that she, not the gods, is the primary cause of her greatest sorrow, losing her relationship with her sister. In *Till We Have Faces*, Lewis uses myth

rhetorically to communicate realities about the roles reason and imagination play in spirituality, about identity, and about the nature of love.

Reason and Imagination

Lewis communicates timeless truths in *Till We Have Faces*, which are best expressed through the rhetoric of myth. First, Lewis presents the need for reconciliation and harmonization between apparent opposites, rationality and imagination in spirituality, both through the characters of the myth and the form of the myth itself. As a boy, after a terrible experience at boarding school, Lewis was brought home to be tutored by Mr. William Kirkpatrick, his father's former headmaster. This tutor, Old Knock, or The Great Knock, as was later he later affectionately named, was a pure rationalist under whom Lewis learned to reason and argue methodically. The resulting work throughout Lewis' life proves the thoroughness of his logical education. Lewis wrote many effective apologetic works, presented popular religious radio talks, and publicly debated Christianity; however, in 1955, a shift became evident in his work. Lewis wrote to an American, Carl Henry, declining the offer to write some apologetic pieces. He believed his flow of thought and talent had shifted from direct apologetic work to other streams, stating, "If I am now good for anything it is for catching the reader unawares—through fiction and symbol. I have done what I could in the way of frontal attacks, but I now feel quite sure those days are over (Tandy, "Ambivalence" 7). Lewis had written fiction before this time, and continued to write non-fiction after this, but his days of the direct rhetorical formal oratory were finished. Notice that the paths Lewis was following were not less spiritual; however, he was focusing more on imaginative means to communicate

truth. This distinction is important, particularly since much of his life had been spent in apologetic endeavors.

Later in his life, Lewis experienced crises on several fronts (personally, emotionally, and even in the public apologetic arena), and a distinct shift occurred in Lewis' work. MacGrath notes "how few of his writings of this later period of his life deal specifically with apologetic themes, if understood in terms of the explicit rational defence of the Christian faith" (Tandy, "Ambivalence" 7). In fact, "going forward he would appeal to his audience, not through the frontal attacks of rational argument, but indirectly through imagination" (7). In truth, though, Lewis had a lifelong enthrallment with the imaginative, which, in many ways, he fought against in his younger years. Before his conversion, he was embarrassed by this pull toward imaginative and mythical literature, which he saw as childish. Also in those days, so much of what was spiritual and religious seemed irrational and illogical to him. Clearly, in his early life, Lewis heralded reason and gave logic high importance in his thoughts and writing. Even as he did, he struggled with an unquenchable desire for delight in the imaginative. Lewis certainly is not the first or last to feel this draw. Many people, however, accept the fact/value split³, disparaging anything imaginative and viewing reason and logic as inherently superior.

Early in his life, Lewis's acceptance of the fact/value split was a stumbling block to true faith. This barrier to "his conversion was the emerging contradiction between his reason and his imagination" according to Art Lindsley, former president and current Senior Fellow of the C.S. Lewis Institute (1). Recognizing the true myth of Christ opened his eyes to understanding that he was not abandoning reason to be carried away with

³ The fact/value split is discussed extensively by Francis Schaeffer in *Escape From Reason* and *The God Who Is There*, and by Nancy Pearcey in *Total Truth*, as well as other works.

imagination, but rather reason and myth are not mutually exclusive. Conversion removed this dichotomy for Lewis. In “Bluspels and Flalansferes,” the reconciling of these ideas can be seen when Lewis declares, “Reason is the natural organ of truth; but imagination is the organ of meaning” (265). At his conversion, he no longer viewed reason and imagination in conflict, but he could finally see how both are reconciled in the true myth. Once he reached this understanding, Lewis began to create a wide variety of works filled with depth and truth, taking into account the reader’s whole person. In fact, Lindsley asserts that an essential part of why C.S. Lewis’ popularity is not waning “would be the way in which he combines reason and imagination” (1). Furthermore, Tandy observes, “It seems fair to say that rather than abandoning apologetics, he discovered how to do apologetics through a different medium. Lewis would continue to use rhetoric, but he would use it for different effects and in imaginative forms that would renew his zeal for writing and captivate his readers in a surprising way” (“Ambivalence” 5). After this shift, Lewis did not abandon rationality; rather his fiction continues to convince about the reasonableness of faith through the means of the imagination. Lewis seemed to delight particularly in using the rhetoric of myth to persuade his readers of truth.

Lewis portrays his early struggle between the rational and imaginative/mystical throughout his myth, *Till We Have Faces*, which retells the Cupid and Psyche myth. While illustrating this struggle, he also points to the realities that led to reconciling these ideas. Lewis narrates the ancient myth from a different narrative viewpoint and includes crucial changes like making sure the sisters of Psyche cannot see the gods or the gods’ palace. Also, he cleverly uses a framing technique, inserting a myth within the mythic retelling when Orual visits another kingdom and finds a statue of a veiled goddess. This

technique highlights Lewis' first characteristic of myth, which is extra-literary. The myth can be retold in many versions and forms without losing any significance.

In the narrative, Orual asks the local priest about this goddess, and the priest tells her the story. She reacts indignantly, recognizing her and her sister's story. Addressing this indignance, Professor of Theology at the University of St. Thomas, Peter Rolnick, asserts that "because Orual perceives inaccuracies in the story—both the non-problematic way the sisters can see the palace and the sisters' alleged jealousy—she is infuriated and determined to write the story as she 'knows' it really happened" (Rolnick 27). Her emotional reaction to this narrative prompts her to employ narrative to present a judicial case, recording her perception of the truth and striving to display the injustice of the gods toward her. She reacts viscerally to the experience of hearing her story, as King David does to experiencing the story of the poor man and his lamb told by the prophet Nathan. The narrative relayed to Orual and King David is an example of engaging the imagination, which Lewis prioritizes. Experiencing the story moves the hearer to action. The action that Orual takes, however, goes back to relying on reason. She uses judicial rhetoric to try to convince the hearer of her perspective. Her rhetoric is less effective than Nathan's or Lewis's. The juxtaposition of the two types of rhetoric illustrates Lewis's preference for myth.

In many ways the false dichotomy Lewis experiences between reason and spirituality is Orual's struggle. Reason and imagination are symbolized within the myth by the characters, the Fox and the Priest. The character most likely to appeal to the Western mind and the most logical person in the story is called the Fox. He is representative of the rational side of a soul. Fox had been sold as a slave to the King of

Glome to pass along Greek wisdom to the royal household. The king tells the slave he wants his yet-to-be-born son to be “brought up in all the wisdom of your people” (*Faces* 7). In the meantime, the tutor could practice on the king’s daughters. “Especially the elder. See if you can make her wise; it’s about all she will ever be good for” (7). About the Fox, one scholar observes, “Lewis adds depth by introducing a Greek philosopher captured in battle, a Stoic whom they call the Fox. The Fox becomes the sisters’ beloved tutor, teaching them naturalist, rationalist principles that question the validity of the Greek myths and beliefs as well as Glome’s earthier, less elegant myths and beliefs” (Rolnick 26).

Orual notes how different the Fox is from the other slaves, cheering himself up with sayings like, “No man can be an exile if he remembers that all the world is one city” and “Everything is as good or bad as our opinions makes it” (*Faces* 7). Orual reports that Fox (reminiscent of young Lewis) was ashamed of loving poetry as much as he did, calling it “all folly.” The girls could only get him to share a poem after they had completed their philosophy reading and writing, but Orual observed that when quoting poetry, “the real lilt came into his voice and the real brightness into his eyes” (*Faces* 9). Since no king around could produce the same, the king demanded that the Fox teach the girls a Greek hymn to sing for his second wedding ceremony. The Fox protested, doubting the ability to achieve such a feat in the remaining timeframe. The king exploded at the slave’s protests, threatening him with a sound beating. Later, the Fox declared in Orual’s hearing that teaching the hymn to these barbarians turned his last hairs grey.

Rolnick observes that “the Fox is the quintessential rationalist, a naturalist like the ancient Stoics; and it is no accident that he resembles many unbelievers in our own

scientific age” (28–29). He is clearly deeply familiar with Platonic teaching while taking a position in the camp of the stoics—although the old songs and poetry affect him more than he wishes to admit. The Fox is an adept teacher, and Orual’s actions can often be tracked by his impact on her life. Orual’s rhetoric, both in her judicial accusation as well as her latter rule of her kingdom, demonstrates the Fox’s lessons and advice. His rhetorical teaching “evidently...included instruction in rhetoric as well as philosophy, for Orual's thinking reflects ancient patterns of thought known as stasis and the *dissoi logoi*” (Sullivan 43). Ancient rhetoric employed a systematic approach called stasis to identify the argument of a case. Stasis examined aspects such as whether the act happened, how it should be defined, whether it was justifiable, and what should be done about it. *Dissoi logoi* can be translated as “contradictory words.” This rhetorical exercise is similar to the phrase heard in a modern courtroom, “the preponderance of the evidence.” *Dissoi logoi* is concerned with what happens in the mind of the hearer or judge when one point or action seems convincing but when all the arguments for courses of action “are incommensurable when viewed together. These patterns appear three times in Orual's attempts to figure out how to react to her encounter with Psyche: once on the mountain with Psyche herself, once with Bardia shortly after the encounter, and once with the Fox after she returns” (Sullivan 43). These three events narrated by Orual clearly show the pattern of logic not present in the rhetoric of Glome before the arrival of the stoic slave, the Fox. She emulates the logical methods the Fox taught her to attempt to sort out how she should react to these confusing, emotional situations. She wants to believe in the power of logic, but the mystical has a deep hold on her.

Standing in contrast to the Fox and his rationality is the Priest of Ungit, representing primitive religious superstition. The sacred man is steeped in the superstitions, rituals, and even the smells of the holy. Orual describes her fear of the Priest, especially his smell. She writes, “I think that what frightened me (in those early days) was the holiness of the smell that hung about him—a temple-smell of blood (mostly pigeons’ blood, but he had sacrificed men, too) and burnt fat and singed hair and wine and stale incense” (*Faces* 11). The spiritual for Orual was about the experience. Her natural senses, particularly her sense of smell, are deeply linked to this mystical holiness. For Orual at this point in the narrative, the rational is completely other and separate from the spiritual. Many modern readers accept the same belief without pausing to question it.

Lewis sets up an important debate between the rational Fox and the religious priest early in the myth. This debate illustrates Lewis’ sixth characteristic of myth, that the story is numinous. Lewis is communicating spiritual realities through this narrative. This scene also highlights the third mythic characteristic by describing a universal human struggle. Rolnick calls this confrontation “a great literary and theological moment” in which “the airiness of the Fox’s naturalism brutally contested by the Priest’s cultic dedication to Ungit and her son, the Shadowbrute, the god of the mountain” (*Faces* 29). In the wake of the destruction of woes and pestilence that had fallen on the kingdom, the Priest comes to the palace in all his awful finery to deliver a message from the gods to the king. He declares that the famine, plague, drought, imminent war, and lack of male heirs prove that Ungit is angry about the impurity of the land (45). The goddess’ anger, of course, never comes without cause, and past generations appeased her anger over their

sin through the blood sacrifice of the Accursed one. The people of Glome must find the Accursed and make the Great Offering to the Brute. The king is troubled by this news, the rhetoric of the mystical priest, and paces up and down the Pillar Room. He recalls that sightings of the terrible Brute, the son of Ungit of the Grey Mountain, have occurred recently, just as they had in the past generations. The king's response is one example of the seriousness—the graveness—of this narrative, Lewis' fifth characteristic of myth. The king, as brutal as he was, believes in these mystical realities. Perhaps, like many readers, he struggles with the weight of spiritual consequences, striving to understand a proper response to them.

The Fox begins to object to these conflicting eye-witness reports based on logical fact, presenting the counter to the spiritual and mystical interpretation. Through the Fox's arguments, Lewis continues to highlight the rational perspective. How could the Brute be seen as a shadow when the man seeing him had a torch? Would the shadow not be behind the Brute? When the King asks more about the Great Offering, the Priest continues with his insistence on the mystery of the Brute and the Great Offering to appease Ungit using highly paradoxical language. The Fox protests more. The Brute is somehow both Ungit and Ungit's son. How can this be? The sacrifice, if male, is Ungit's husband, but if female, then the Brute's wife. How does this make sense? And the marriage is somehow a devouring associated with the Brute's supper. The priest seems unfazed by these inconsistencies, calling them mysteries, but the Fox can hardly contain himself:

'Do you not see, Master,' said the Fox, 'that the Priest is talking nonsense.' A shadow is to be an animal which is also a goddess which is also a god, and loving is to be eating—a child of six would talk more sense. And a moment ago the

victim of this abominable sacrifice was to be the Accursed, the wickedest person in the whole land, offered as a punishment. And now it is to be the best person in the whole land—the perfect victim—married to the god as a reward. Ask him which he means. It can't be both. (*Faces* 49–50)

At this point, the reader agrees, shouting, “Yes! Which way, Priest? It can't be both!” And we expect the narrator, Orual, to say the same. Instead, she responds to the memory of the confrontation resignedly, “If any hope had put up its head within me when the Fox began, it was killed. This sort of talk could do no good” (50). The Priest believes the same, declaring that this Greek wisdom does not bring rain or grow corn as sacrifice does. He states this as a matter of fact, not opinion. Everyone in Glome knows this to be true. Lewis indicates that the rational alone is not more convincing than the spiritual. The reader must wrestle and keep reading to understand this point of view eventually.

Lewis's use of an unfamiliar setting predisposes the reader to not understand this point initially. The unfamiliarity is like a foreign language, which the reader has not yet learned understand meaning, and exemplifies Lewis' preference to “catch the reader unawares.” This culture's treatment of slaves, belief in the gods, participation in bloody sacrifices, and their pagan superstitions about childbirth and other natural events all disorient the modern audience, even while the audience is learning about Glome and Orual's story. According to professor and scholar Dr. Brent Little, one reason the Fox rejects Orual's response is his belief that “language, even the symbolic language of ritual, must have a singular meaning, capable of being articulated with clarity, devoid of mystery, and coherent with human reason. The Fox's strict adherence to Stoic reason does not allow for paradox; as Myers notes, the Fox's Greek wisdom obstructs his ability

to ‘grasp holy mysteries.’” (Little 123). The Priest goes on to assert that “Holy places are dark places. It is life and strength, not knowledge and words, that we get in them. Holy wisdom is not clear and thin like water, but thick and dark like blood. Why should the Accursed not be both the best and the worst?” (*Faces* 50). Lewis wants the reader to come to realize that “the priest’s religious language is paradoxical, and to discern paradox requires one to hold contraries in tension” (Little 123). Lewis is building toward the reality that reason does not have to be abandoned in developing one’s spiritual life.

Only apparently contradictory, rationality and spirituality are not mutually exclusive. These contraries can be held simultaneously, particularly as experienced through the rhetoric of myth. Lewis is developing the case through his rhetoric of myth that reason alone is not enough for the life of faith. As Orual narrates the interaction, she compares the gaunt, bird-like priest with the piqued Fox. She asserts her preference for the Fox, wishing she could make him king and kill the priest, “but it was easy to see on which side the strength lay” (*Faces* 51). She knew the Fox did not win this debate. Reason alone does not satisfy.

What is Lewis doing rhetorically in this episode? He intentionally places the story in the context of a primitive, superstitious people who worship mystical gods through blood sacrifice—a setting quite foreign to the modern mind. This foregrounding makes the Fox one of the most appealing characters for his rational sensibility and good nature in difficult circumstances. He clearly cares deeply for the girls, and Orual and Psyche eventually call him Grandfather. The stoic Fox is horrified by the thought of human sacrifice—all things in tune to the modern mind. Lewis’ myth-making defamiliarizes the audience, allowing Lewis to catch the reader unawares with an important point: that

reason alone is not enough for the spiritual life. British Literature and C.S. Lewis scholar Peter Schakel observes that “like Lewis before his conversion, Orual is caught in a tension between rational discourse and religious belief” (“Till We Have Faces” 285). This myth displays the truth that faith must come with a reconciliation between reason and imagination. Reason does not need to be abandoned in pursuit of spiritual things, but reason alone is also not enough for the life of faith.

Orual’s complaint of the gods depicts the struggle to reconcile the rational and mystical. Her question is not so much whether the gods exist and are real but whether they have acted justly. She relies on logic through her judicial rhetoric to lay out the facts of her case—the events of her life—that show how unjustly the gods have treated her. She strives to be as objective as possible, not minimizing her faults and failings in her retelling; however, she is not completely a reliable narrator because, as we discover at the end of the story (as does Orual), she is deceived about her own motivations. Many of the tragedies of her life are rooted in her choices and manipulations. Through the rhetoric of myth, Lewis indicates that reason can and must be reconciled with imagination and spiritual realities, not one excluded in favor of the other. The juxtaposition of reason and imagination is not the only truth Lewis communicates through his myth, *Till We Have Faces*. He also illuminates realities about identity through his rhetoric of myth.

Identity

Next Lewis rhetorically highlights another humanly universal, the theme of identity, along with hidden divinity, using the related symbols of veils, masks, and faces. These symbols are tied additionally to the ideas of beauty and ugliness. Orual decides to adopt the veil permanently after using it to hide her identity when first going to seek out

Psyche's fate. After this fateful trip, she finds power and strength by hiding her ugliness. Shortly after her decision to permanently wear the veil, her father summons her and the Fox to appear before him. The king cruelly laughs at her "curtains," asking if she is "afraid we'd be dazzled by your beauty" and demands she remove her "frippery" (*Faces* 181). She (for the first time) calmly refuses to comply, pointing out the irony that she would be scolded both for her face and for covering her face. He lost his power over her, and "she never feared him again" (182). The veil, at first, was a way to hide both her identity and her objectionable features. Eventually, though, the covering did not just hide her identity but also gave her a new one. Before long, her father, the King, had grown very ill and could no longer negotiate. When it looked as if war would come from a neighboring kingdom, Orual the Princess spoke in her father's place. At this point, another priest, Arnon, regretfully expressed the misfortune that Princess Orual was not married, since a woman could not lead the troops out in war. If she were married, they would have a king to lead the troops. The faithful soldier Bardia, who had trained Orual in swordsmanship, insisted, "This Queen can" lead the troops (*Faces* 187). The priest examined Orual's face closely. She remembered, "I think my veil served me better than the boldest countenance in the world, maybe better than beauty would have done" (187). He could not see her fear and could only hear the determination in her voice. Her veil prevented her face from betraying her emotions. Through the rhetoric of myth, the reader can experience the pain of Orual's father's words, the fear of coming battle along with the determination to protect her country, and even the power of the veil.

The symbol of the veil in Lewis' myth-making is key to establishing her new identity as queen, and it gives her power to negotiate with rival nations, but it also begins

to divide her from herself as Orual. The myth utilizes this symbol to raise questions about the nature of identity and what role identity holds in facing a hidden divinity. After a tense day with the king nearing death and Orual planning with advisors for an approaching battle, she was glad for the silence to recollect herself for the difficult days ahead leading her people in wartime. She recalled, “There seemed to have been another woman acting and speaking in my place. Call her the Queen; but Orual was someone different and now I was Orual again” (199). She continues, “I looked back on the things the Queen had done and wondered at them. Did that Queen truly think she would kill Argan? I, Orual, as I now saw, did not believe it. I was not even sure I could fight him” (200). Also, ironically, because of her veil, the Queen gained a reputation for beauty, though she most certainly was not (228). The veil helped her cope with her actions and responsibilities but also fractured her to create another identity. The myth allows the reader to experience the process of an identity being fractured, and the resulting issues.

As far as how the veil relates to hidden deities, “Orual does not adopt a veil so that she can approach the gods. Instead, the veil symbolizes her separation from them” (Hans 43). Schakel lists several possible interpretations for the veil, including a literal veil of the action, but more than that, “a group of possibilities radiating out from the central image,” including direct and conventional symbolic meanings (*Reason and Imagination* 56). Some scholars believe that because there are many possible interpretations, the correct interpretation is not crucial. Hans partially agrees with this view, asserting that “if there were one correct meaning, *Till We Have Faces* would slip into allegory rather than myth. Instead, Orual’s veil carries a range of meanings because individuals have their own veils—the pretenses separating humanity from God. The

central image, therefore, is that of personality, defined self-knowledge and open relationship with others, including the divine” (Hans 44). This multiplicity of representative meaning both highlights the extra-literary nature of myth, as well as Lewis’ second mythic characteristic, its inevitableness. Knowing the story does not reduce its effect on the reader. The myth can be read again and again with differing aspects of the symbol deeply affecting the reader.

Orual needed to come to terms with herself, her character, and her identity before she could come into relationship with the divine, which is of course, true for the reader as well. Schakel further sees the symbolism of the veil as a symbol itself that reaches back to the theme of reason and imagination. After all, a symbol uses a literal image to hide meaning through myth, which the imagination must come to understand. Schakel further explains, “In a work which explores reason and imagination as a central theme, the veil suggests that the full value of symbol (and metaphor and myth) may be hidden, unrecognized by the over rational mind, as Lewis failed to ‘see’ it fully early in his life. And it suggests that *Till We Have Faces* itself reveals the full value of myth in conveying eternal and universal truths to the receptive heart and mind” (*Reason and Imagination* 56–57). The veil’s symbolism is connected to the apparent tension between reason and imagination while furthering the theme of identity and how a person relates to God and others.

Late in her life, through the revelation of messengers and the myth of the veiled goddess she discovers on her travels, Orual comes to some important realizations. She sees Redival’s flirtatious indiscretions, which she had despised previously, in a new light. A messenger from a nearby kingdom turns out to be a former flame of Redival, whom

her father castrated and drove away (*Faces* 254–256). When Orual recognizes him, “he reveals that Redival had turned to his physical affections because she was so lonely, so dejected by Orual’s cessation of affection for her when the Fox and Psyche came onto the scene” (Rolnick 42). She is still not yet ready for this truth and lashes out, “If this is all true, I’ve been wrong all my life. Everything has to be begun over again” (*Faces* 115). Orual begins to be confronted about her actions and the role her actions played in her difficult life. The cracks are starting to form in her stubborn perspective, but these revelations alone do not break through her self-deception. Supernatural interventions taking the form of visions given by the gods will be what finally breaks through, helping Orual recognize her manipulative, selfish faults.

Another formative incident for Orual related to the symbol of the veil comes when she visits the widow of her loyal captain Bardia, after his death. Orual even removes her veil, and after a moment of connection, Bardia’s wife sharply tells Orual, “I begin to think you know nothing of love” (*Faces* 264). This was a painful jab in a tender area, and Lewis’ rhetoric of myth allows the reader to feel a jab of pain for and with Orual. I will discuss aspects of love in the next section; however, Orual angrily considers how she should punish the woman for her insolence but does not follow through. Later, she explains, “And now those divine Surgeons had me tied down and were at work. My anger protected me only for a short time; anger wearies itself out and truth comes in” (266). Her anger protects her like her veil did—for a time, they each serve a purpose. She uses her veil to veil “herself from the world as Psyche’s world was veiled from her” (Edwards 129). The veil provides Orual with a public identity as the Queen but also allows her to hide from others and from herself in many ways. Orual insists that the veil

is “convenient because it hides her unattractive features from her subjects, but the reader is aware that in veiling herself, she is choosing to hide from the consequences of her actions, from the gods, and ultimately from herself” (Jebb 111). The veil is symbolically a barrier preventing her from facing her true self. Without a face or an identity, she has no way to relate to God or other people. When Orual takes off her veil “and confronts her true self, and gains a ‘face’ can she encounter God, without defences, excuses or pretenses, for ‘how can [God] meet us face to face, have faces?’ By removing the veil, by dying to self, she becomes able to live for others:” (Schakel, “Till We Have Faces” 286–287). At this point, Orual can finally say to Psyche, “Never again will I call you mine...but all there is of me shall be yours” (*Faces* 305). Lewis skillfully creates symbolism in his rhetoric to show how Orual can face herself and her sister. Because she can finally see how her love has become manipulative, she can change. She no longer desires to possess Psyche for herself but can freely give all she has for her sister’s good. Instead of taking from Psyche, Orual can now bless Psyche, displaying *agape* love.

For the Christian, Lewis’ symbolic use of the veil brings to mind Moses of the Old Testament. As a contrast with Orual, Moses chooses to veil his face after a personal encounter with God, to reassure the people of Israel. After Moses had received the stone tablets from God on Mount Sinai, “the skin of his face shone because he had been talking with God” (*ESV Bible*, Exodus 34:29). The people were terrified because of his visage, so he covered it. Orual, on the other hand, caused more fear and held more power because she wore a veil. She used her veil to protect herself, not others. 2 Corinthians 3:12–18 explains the significance of Moses’ veil further and ties it to Christ. Paul, in this passage, states:

Since we have such a hope, we are very bold, not like Moses, who would put a veil over his face so that the Israelites might not gaze at the outcome of what was being brought to an end. But their minds were hardened. For to this day, “when they read the old covenant, that same veil remains unlifted, because only through Christ is it taken away. Yes, to this day whenever Moses is read a veil lies over their hearts. But when one turns to the Lord, the veil is removed. Now the Lord is the Spirit, and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom. And we all, with unveiled face, beholding the glory of the Lord, are being transformed into the same image from one degree of glory to another. For this comes from the Lord who is the Spirit (2 Cor 3:12–18).

This passage connects conversion’s transformation with removing a veil that is a barrier. Through Christ, through turning to the Lord, the veil is removed, giving freedom. After conversion, believers can view God’s glory without the veil needed by the Old Testament Israelites.

Another significant veil in the Bible is the temple veil that separates the holiest place where God dwells. When Christ was crucified, the temple veil was torn in two, symbolizing the way to the Father being opened through his sacrifice. Christ’s flesh is described as the veil in Hebrews:

Therefore, brothers, since we have confidence to enter the holy places by the blood of Jesus, by the new and living way that he opened for us through the curtain, that is, through his flesh, and since we have a great priest over the house of God, let us draw near with a true heart in full assurance of faith, with our hearts

sprinkled clean from an evil conscience and our bodies washed with pure water.

(Hebrews 10:19–22)

The temple veil symbolizes Christ's flesh, which opens the way referred to in 2 Corinthians. Christ's flesh opens the way to freedom. This is the way that brings transformation.

Certainly, these Biblical examples are in Lewis' mind as he develops the symbolism of Orual's veil. Like Moses' veil, Orual's veil acts as a barrier between herself and other people. Through the narrative, the reader also experiences how the veil divides and separates. However, Moses wears a veil to protect others, while Orual uses her veil to protect herself. The veil in the holy temple divides and separates as well. This veil separates the unholy from God and the place he dwells. Christ's sacrifice, though, has opened the way between God and man, giving man the opportunity to behold face-to-face the glory of God and one day to dwell with him eternally.

Lewis encourages the reader to wonder what could ever cause Orual to desire to come face-to-face with her actions, to desire to live openly with her family and subjects, and to be able to see her God finally. Her perspective begins to shift through "words spoken by others about how she has used those around her, especially her faithful tutor, the Fox, and Bardia, her faithful friend and servant" (Smith 111). In addition, coming to understand Redival better helps Orual face the truth about herself. Finally, "visions and dreams force her to descend deep inside herself and to recognize what she has become" (Smith 111). Reason and imagination produce a revelation of self. These realizations, this new perspective, help Orual remove her veil, allowing her to face the truth without hiding. She realizes her veil has actually harmed her more than helped her. Finally, she

can know herself; however, “the emphasis upon the assenting ‘to be so known’ is crucial—we assent to be known and therefore we assent to know ourselves and to know God. Unveiling, paradoxically, allows us to know God and to know ourselves reflected in Him” (Smith 121). For a time, Moses needed to be veiled because he saw the glory of the Lord, and the people were afraid of him. This experience of the divine transformed him. Today, people experience transformation through the veil of Christ’s flesh, which opens the way to God. Lewis uses universal and numinous aspects of myth to reveal these realities about identity—the joy and fulfillment of knowing oneself and having authentic connections with others and God. Since myth is extra-literary and feels inevitable, the reader also experiences the importance of the realities of identity and connection symbolized by the veil and face. The truth is not limited by form but can be retold and experienced over and over, recognizing differing aspects without a loss of enjoyment through repetition. Lewis not only develops this myth to point out important truths about the role of reason and imagination in faith and about identity and connection but also about the nature of love.

The Nature of Love

Finally, Lewis displays the nature of love, as well as its corruptions, through the rhetoric of myth via Orual’s numinous story. Through the rhetoric of myth, Lewis again draws attention to a universal human issue, allowing the reader to experience the various aspects of love. Lewis first discussed his ideas on the types of love in letters in the early 1940s and later in his book, *The Great Divorce*. He further developed these ideas in many letters throughout the next decade—at which point he developed the character of Orual,

who embodies these ideas. In a letter to Kilby, he wrote, “Orual is (not just a symbol but) an instance, a ‘case’ of human affection in its natural condition: true, tender, suffering, but in the long run, tyrannically possessive and ready to turn to hatred when the beloved ceases to be its possession” (Schakel 286). He further developed his thoughts in *The Four Loves*, published four years after *Till We Have Faces*. Lewis borrows from the Greek to explain the four types of love he has in mind. The first three loves, *eros* (romantic love), *storge* (affection), and *philia* (friendship), are based on human nature. Each of these loves cannot be maintained indefinitely. Eventually, if unchecked, they will devolve into jealousy or even hatred. In *The Four Loves*, Lewis declares, “Love, having become a god, becomes a demon” (83). The fourth, *agape*, is a divine, sacrificial love. *Agape* redeems the natural loves, keeping them pure. This divine love “is the selfless love of God for humanity; but by a divine gift, God also enables humans to extend his love to God and other humans” (Schakel 286). Christ’s sacrifice creates a way for man to come face-to-face with God and is the evidence of this divine love. This provision transforms man through conversion, healing man’s relationship both with God and also with fellow humans.

Lewis explores *eros* in both the relationship between Psyche and her divine “Shadowbrute” husband, who is Cupid, in the ancient version of the myth. While not addressed in this paper, this kind of love is also examined in Orual’s hidden desires for her captain Bardia. Of the relationship between Psyche and the Shadowbrute, Dr. Nancy Enright observes, “Psyche's experience with her god-lover Cupid not only offers a resemblance to our relationship with God but, for Psyche, is also an actual approach to God, since Cupid as the god of love embodies both the Divine nature and, mythically

rendered, the God who is Love” (105). When Orual finally finds Psyche again after the sacrifice, while sitting in the golden palace, Orual could not see; she could not bear to hear of Psyche talking about the god of the Grey Mountain. Psyche told her sister of how well she had been cared for by the ministering spirits of the palace and of the one in particular whom she called, “My god, of course. My lover. My husband. The Master of my House” (*Faces* 122). Even though she believed in the gods and mystical happenings throughout her life, Orual could not accept that Psyche could have been cared for by a god or married to a god. She also could not actually see the palace, table, and cup of wine Psyche insisted was here and all around her, so she would not believe it. The most horrific thought, though, still was that of her dearest sister belonging in marriage or any other way to someone else.

At this point in the narrative, Lewis’ famous “liar, lunatic, or Lord” trilemma⁴ can be seen in a new context. Psyche has never been a liar, but Orual believes she could not possibly be telling the truth, so Psyche must be taken by madness. When Psyche refuses to return home with her, even after Orual becomes violent, Orual mournfully declares, “I learned then how one can hate those one loves” (*Faces* 127). On the next visit with Psyche, Orual becomes even more manipulative and insults the god’s intentions for being with Psyche, insinuating they are only together for the physical aspects of the relationship. Psyche responds, “Then you know little of love,” to which Orual angrily responds, “You fling my virginity in my face again, do you? Better than the sty you’re in.

⁴ This logical argument can be found in Book 2 Chapter 3 of Lewis’ *Mere Christianity* regarding the deity of Christ. Another form of the same trilemma, similar to the usage in *Till We Have Faces*, is used by the professor to assess Lucy’s statements and behavior in *The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe*. When her siblings were doubting her testimony about being transported to the magical land of Narnia, the professor asks: Is she characterized by lying? Does she have signs of lunacy? No to both? Then it is most logical to assume she is telling the truth.

So be it. Of what you now call love, I know nothing” (162–163). Like the interaction with Bardia’s wife, Psyche hits on a tender area: Orual’s virginity. If she had been beautiful like her sister Redial, she would have easily been married off. Her father was desperate for a solution like a marriage alliance to his political problems; however, Orual was ugly. While Psyche may have meant *eros* with her retort, Orual’s actions demonstrate she did not understand the other types of love as well.

Psyche and Orual’s interaction on the mountain also delves into the *storge* love between them. This love is affection and is not exclusive to, but “rooted in familial love and particularly connected with the bond between parents and their children, especially mother and child. *Storge* is a love that embraces in a comfortable familiarity those with whom we are linked, whether these ties arise through family, work, neighborhood, or something else” (Enright 97). Orual takes on a motherly role with Psyche when she is quite young. She cares for Psyche’s every need and essentially raises her. Psyche even called her sister “Maia,” her term of endearment, sounding remarkably like “mama.” Orual also tries to protect her in many ways, even offering to be sacrificed in place of Psyche. In return for her selfless love, “Orual is beaten by her father for this defense of her sister, and Bardia, the soldier whom Orual secretly loves (with *eros*), remarks on how brave Orual is as she tries to defend Psyche from being taken” (Enright 99). However, eventually, this love turns to jealousy over Psyche when she cannot keep her. Her caring, protective love became increasingly destructive until it was no longer love. Eventually, she fumes in jealous hate. If she could not have Psyche, she feels no one else should be able to either. Lewis not only addresses *eros* and *storge* but also demonstrates *philia* in his myth.

Lewis shows *philia*, often called brotherly love, in the relationship between the Fox and Orual particularly. Unlike *eros* or *storge*, which are more physical, visceral loves, Lewis describes *philia* as the love closest to the angels (*Four Loves* 88–89). He lamented the lessening importance of *philia* in the modern era, believing this development regarding companionship to be a great loss. Throughout the myth, “Orual, Psyche, and the Fox, their tutor, enjoy *philia*, a friendship that develops out of their affection (*storge*), but goes beyond it through common interests” (Enright 102). Orual and Psyche spend much of their time as children with the Fox: “The Fox was so trusted by now that when my father did not need him. He was allowed to take us anywhere, even miles from the palace. We were often out all day in summer on the hill-top to the southwest, looking down on all Glome and across to the Grey Mountain” (*Faces* 23). The companionship among the three meant at least as much as the lessons the Fox imparts to the girls. While the king was dying, Glome was in a precarious state. A neighboring kingdom was experiencing succession turmoil between brothers, which threatened to spill over into Glome. Orual assumes the kingdom's leadership and aligns herself with one brother while challenging the other to one-on-one combat. Although she had been well-trained in sword fighting by Bardia, the Fox is distraught at this proposition, both because it is against nature and improper, as well as because he loves her dearly and fears the outcome. His *philia* for her is clear, as he begs her to reconsider, calling her “my daughter.”

Both the Fox's and Orual's *philia* for each other can be seen in the Fox's apology the next day. He says, “Daughter, I did badly last night. I think this offer to fight the Prince yourself is foolish and, what's more, unseemly. But I was wrong to weep and beg

and try to force you by your love. Love is not a thing to be so used” (*Faces* 204). After Orual becomes queen, the Fox, although now free, remains to serve her as a wise counselor, which she needs desperately.

However, one of the dangers of *philia* is exclusivity. Orual exhibits this exclusivity against Redival, because, in Orual’s mind, “it was Redival who ended the good time (24). Redival did not wish to be with the Fox and her sisters much in the early days; however, later, after the king catches Redival “kissing and making love-talk” with an officer of the guard and demands that she be always watched by the Fox, at the cost of his life. The Fox and Psyche seem to accept her return without incident, but Orual is resentful of the intrusion. Orual reports, “She was always with us. And that cooled any love she had for Psyche or me” (26). What is very clear is that Orual’s love cools for Redival. The first-person narrative means the reader can only be sure this is Orual’s version of what occurred, but according to Orual, Redival “yawned and she quarreled and she mocked” (*Faces* 26). For some reason, one day, Redival hits Orual’s dear Psyche, and Orual loses control. She finds herself astride Redival. Redival’s face is now frothed with blood, and Orual’s hands are around her sister’s throat. The relationship is broken. As an older woman, through a messenger and visions from the gods, Orual realizes how she has hurt Redival and how her actions contributed to Redival’s tendency to chase after young men looking for love. Like *eros* and *storge*, *philia* can become corrupted.

Each of these loves, to remain pure, needs to be governed and redeemed by *agape*. *Agape* is the “Gift-Love, which seeks the good of the beloved and helps the other kinds of love avoid the pitfalls that can turn any of them into a kind of hatred” (Enright 107). This divine love purifies *eros*, *storge*, and *philia*. Orual brings her judicial case

looking for justice, or at least acknowledging how unjust and difficult her life had been. She gains revelation, however, through delivered messages and through visions granted to her by the gods, which help her come to see the motivations she had hidden from herself. She needs this revelation to be able to come to the higher, more pure *agape* love. She has worn a veil to hide from her own manipulative motivations, and the removal of the veil allows Orual to come to see and know herself truly.

The redemption of Orual is complete when Psyche gives her the casket filled with beauty. She says to her sister, "Did I not tell you, Maia . . . that a day was coming when you and I would meet in my house and no cloud between us?" (*Faces* 306). Orual sees herself and her sister reflected in the water, both now beautiful, both transformed, the god's voice confirming the transformation, "You also are Psyche" (308). Now, "all Orual's fears of the gods, her doubts about herself and about her sister's encounter with the god of the mountain, are resolved" (Enright 113). Orual tells the God of the Grey Mountain, "I ended my first book with the words *no answer*. I know now, Lord, why you utter no answer. You are yourself the answer" (*Faces* 208). Her relationship with her sister is redeemed in her transformation; however, Orual also finally has an answer to her complaint. Coming into a relationship with her Lord resolved her doubts and fears. She finally sees herself and her life as she could not before when she was veiled. Lewis's rhetoric of myth invites the reader to look through Orual's eyes and examine the four types of love as she experienced them in all their forms. Lewis skillfully uses myth to embody the various types of love, both corrupted and redeemed.

Conclusion

In *Till We Have Faces*, Orual uses judicial rhetoric to accuse the gods of treating her unjustly. Her appeal includes five of Cicero's six parts of judicial rhetoric, including the three required parts. Also, by applying Cicero's test (which gathers all the actions attributed to a person into one place to determine if there is any inconsistency in the character of the person), the reader can see that Orual goes to great lengths not to paint herself in a rosy light and readily admits her failures and bad behavior. This portrayal gives the reader a fairly reliable picture of the events and actions that occurred. The main issue is that Orual is deceived for most of the narrative about her own motivations, making interpreting those events a little more difficult. Through telling her story and through the visions of the gods, however, she realizes in the end that "the complaint was the answer. To have heard myself making it was to be answered" (*Faces* 194). Her exercise of rhetoric did not prove the gods guilty of mistreating her, but her practice of it (along with visions from the gods) did bring her to truth in any case. Once she had finished writing down her complaint, she could see more clearly. She could finally see her actions in light of her own motivations. The gods answered with her own work, "The change which the writing wrought in me and of which I did not write was only a beginning—only to prepare me for the gods' surgery. They used my own pen to probe my wound" (253–254). This new perspective encourages the reader to revisit the events of Orual's life to investigate differing meanings and implications than initially presented. In conclusion, the comparison of Orual's rhetoric and Lewis's reveals Lewis's high value of myth for its transformative nature. Myth accomplishes change that direct formal rhetoric cannot always accomplish.

Lewis was not as concerned with how myths arise, as with “the effects of myths as they act upon the conscious imagination of minds” (*Experiment* 45). The transformative power of myth lies in the way the reader experiences truth. In his book on literary criticism, Lewis declares, “The first demand any work of any art makes upon us is to surrender. Look. Listen. Receive. Get yourself out of the way” (Lewis, *An Experiment in Criticism* 19). Lewis believed that a myth is reduced to simply a story, by removing the imagination and begin to dissect it by focusing only on an analysis of the work. Myth, though, reveals truth and reveals truth that other modes of communication and persuasion cannot. Ralph Wood, scholar of theology and English literature, explains:

Lewis belongs, in fact, to the venerable Christian humanist tradition that can be traced back to Justin Martyr and the second-century Apologists. Their doctrine of the *logos spermatikos*—itself a notion borrowed from the Stoics—holds that God has planted the seed of his word in every time and place, culture and person.’ This view of myth allows Lewis to uncover within the story of Cupid and Psyche a profound expression of the Gospel (Enright 95).

This experience of myth works upon the ethos of the reader and changes the reader’s beliefs and, therefore, actions, particularly in the imagination. The moral imagination is key to spiritual development. C. S. Lewis uses the rhetoric of myth to communicate the limitations of judicial rhetoric, the importance of reconciling reason and imagination, the importance of identity in relating to humans and the divine, and the nature of pure and corrupted love.

Lewis’s view of myth includes structural elements; however, the main difference for him in whether a story acts as a myth or not is ultimately based on the lasting impact

it has on the reader's life. The reason myth works in this way is at least partially based on that fact that it is story, not direct, formal oratory. This narrative nature of myth is in part why it is so effective—narrative is rhetorical and persuasive. Narrative works differently upon a person to bring to light realities not otherwise seen. Narrative is how we view life, narrative is beautiful, and narrative communicates meaning and value.

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